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Abstract—We study the problem of optimizing a graph-
structured objective function under adversarial uncertainty. This
problem can be modeled as a two-persons zero-sum game
between an Engineer and Nature. The Engineer controls a subset
of the variables (nodes in the graph), and tries to assign their
values to maximize an objective function. Nature controls the
complementary subset of variables and tries to minimize the same
objective. This setting encompasses estimation and optimization
problems under model uncertainty, and strategic problems with
a graph structure. Von Neumann’s minimax theorem guarantees
the existence of a (minimax) pair of randomized strategies that
provide optimal robustness for each player against its adversary.
We prove several structural properties of this strategy pair
in the case of graph-structured payoff function. In particular,
the randomized minimax strategies (distributions over variable
assignments) can be chosen in such a way to satisfy the Markov
property with respect to the graph. This significantly reduces
the problem dimensionality. Finally we introduce a message
passing algorithm to solve this minimax problem. The algorithm
generalizes max-product belief propagation to this new domain.
I. INTRODUCTION
A two-persons zero-sum game in normal form is specified
by an objective (or utility) function O : (x, θ) 7→ O(x, θ),
whereby x ∈ X is the strategy of the first player (which
we shall call by convention the Engineer), while θ ∈ Θ is
the strategy of the second player (Nature). Once the strategy
pair (x, θ) is chosen, the Engineer earns from Nature an
amount O(x, θ). The two players optimize their strategies with
respect to the opposite objective of maximizing (Engineer) or
minimizing (Nature) the objective. Zero-sum games capture
strategic situations in which agents compete for a fixed, limited
pool of resources [21], [3], [17]. Remarkably, they have found
broad applicability beyond economic theory, including areas
such as online prediction and learning [6], and statistical
decision theory [2]. Here statistical estimation is viewed as
a game between a Statistician (who tries to design the best
statistical procedure) and Nature (who chooses the worst
parameters).
Closer to our motivation, a large variety of optimal design
problems in engineering can be reduced to maximizing an
appropriate objective function. The form of this function
is normally dictated by a model of the underlying system,
with parameters to be estimated empirically. Of course the
parameter estimation process is inherently imprecise and,
more importantly, any model of a real system necessarily
overlooks a multitude of effects. This remark has motivated the
burgeoning fields of robust optimization and robust control [1].
In this context, one considers a family of objective functions
x 7→ O(x; θ), with x the design variables, and θ ∈ Θ a vector
of parameters. Rather than designing for a ‘nominal’ θ∗ ∈ Θ,
one then tries to maximize the worst case cost minθ∈θO(x; θ).
The problem is hence reduced to a two-players zero-sum game.
Robust optimization theory provides a wealth of structural
information, and efficient algorithms for classes of objective
functions O( · , θ) : x 7→ O(x, θ) that are convex in the control
variables x. The present paper takes a complementary point
of view. We assume that both x and θ take values in high-
dimensional, discrete spaces. Explicitly, x = x ∈ X V and
θ = θ ∈ ΘF where X , Θ are finite alphabets and V , F are
finite index sets. Letting |V | = n and |F | = m, a pair of pure
strategies is specified by two vectors: the Engineer controls
variables x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) indexed by the elements of V ,
while Nature controls parameters θ = (θ1, θ2, . . . , θn). Within
this setting we aim at finding strategies for the Engineer which
are optimally robust with respect to Nature.
Of course, this general problem is NP-hard, and indeed so
even in absence of any adversary (since it includes MaxSat
as a special case). Our approach is to exploit simplifications
that follow from the underlying factorization structure of the
objective function. More precisely, we shall assume that the
objective O(x, θ) can be expressed as a sum of terms which
are local on a graph G = (V, F,E), whereby V is the set of
nodes controlled by the Engineer, F the set of nodes controlled
by Nature, and E the edge set.
Graph-structured objective functions naturally arise from
probabilistic graphical models [15]. In particular, if µ(x)
is the probability of configuration x under a probabilistic
graphical model, then logµ(x) is an objective function that
factors additively. Hence MAP estimation falls in the class of
optimization problems considered here. With a slight abuse of
terminology, we shall use the term ‘graphical model’ to refer
to general graph-structured objective functions, even if these
are not originated from probability distributions.
The application to graphical models also clarifies the need
for robustness. Graphical models are particularly effective at
expressing complex relationships. Think for instance to the
subtle relationships between diseases and symptoms in a med-
ical diagnostic systems [16]. Such relationships are normally
modeled through simple parametric families of conditional
probabilities (e.g. logit or noisy OR). However, it is not
expected that these parametric expressions coincide with the
‘true’ conditional distributions. The only solid justification for
this methodology is that the resulting predictions are robust
with respect to the details of the model itself. Robustness
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Fig. 1. Engineer’s objective vs. ∆ for the Ising model example.
is therefore implicitly assumed, but has never been carefully
investigated and accounted for (but see Section IV for related
work).
Apart from the use of graphical models, we achieve sig-
nificant structural simplification by convexifying the space of
strategies, i.e. introducing randomized (mixed) strategies. This
is a well established path within game theory. The Engineer
has at her disposal a stochastic device generating strategy
x ∈ X V with probability p(x), and plays it, while Nature plays
strategy θ ∈ ΘF with probability q(θ). The Engineer tries to
maximize the expected utility E(p,q){O(x, θ)}, while Nature
tries to minimize the same quantity. A crucial consequence is
that the problems faced by the two players become dual linear
programs (LPs). In particular, the celebrated Von Neumann’s
minimax theorem ensures the existence of a saddle point, i.e.
a strategy pair (p∗, q∗) such that for any other strategies p, q
E(p,q∗){O(x, θ)} ≤ E(p∗,q∗){O(x, θ)} ≤ E(p∗,q){O(x, θ)} . (1)
This is equivalent to requiring that (p∗, q∗) forms
a Nash equilibrium. The saddle point condition implies
in particular that the order of play does not matter:
maxp minq E(p,q){O(x, θ)} = minq maxp E(p,q){O(x, θ)}. In
words, p∗ provides to the Engineer optimal robustness against
Nature’s adversarial choice, and indeed the same as if this
choice was known in advance. Remarkably, the worst-case
expected utility of strategy p∗ is in general strictly larger than
the utility of any pure strategy.
Notice that convexification of the strategies space is
achieved at the expense of an exponential blow-up in dimen-
sionality. While a pure strategy for the Engineer is a (discrete)
vector of length n, a mixed strategy is a (probability) vector of
length |X |n. Hence, by itself, convexification does not reduce
the problem complexity.
In the next section we will illustrate key ideas and questions
on a simple example, and then describe our general formalism
and contributions. In Section III we derive a message passing
algorithm, called ROBUST MAX-PRODUCT to construct min-
imax strategies. Finally, we review related work in Section
IV.
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Fig. 2. Ising model example; the solid curves indicate the Engineer’s expected
payoff and the scattered points show the payoff for random instantiations of
mixed strategies. For each value of α, there are 50 random instantiations of
mixed strategies.
II. AN EXAMPLE AND MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS
Ising models. The Ising model is a pairwise graphical model
with binary alphabet X = {−1,+1}. The unnormalized log
probability O(x, θ) = log µ(x) + const. can be written as
O(x, θ) =
∑
(i,j)∈E
ψij(xixj ; θij) +
∑
i∈V
ψi(xi; θi),
ψij(xixj ; θij) = θijxixj , ψi(xi; θi) = θixi.
(2)
In practice, the parameters θ are learned from the data and
hence are inaccurate. The Engineer’s challenge is to find an
strategy p∗(x) which maximize E(p(x),q∗(θ))O(x, θ) for the
worst case distribution q∗ of the uncertain parameter θ.
Minimax strategies depend on the domain of θ. We con-
sidered a family of models with parameters h,∆ ≥ 0.
Single variable potentials have θi ∼ U [−h, h], i.e., θi is
uniformly distributed between −h and h, and edges belong
to two classes: positive and negative. Positive edges have
θij ∈ {+1 − ∆,+1,+1 + ∆} while negative edges have
θij ∈ {−1−∆,−1,−1 + ∆}.
Finding minimax strategies for this model is NP-hard, even
in the special case of ∆ = 0, h = 0. Indeed, when all edges
are negative, this reduces to the MAXCUT problem.
We consider a random tree with n = 93 nodes as the
underlying graph and perform the following experiments.
First Experiment: We apply the ROBUST MAX-PRODUCT
algorithm derived in Section III to find the Engineer’s optimum
strategy, p∗. We further compare it with the case the Engineer
ignores Nature and apply the classical MAX-PRODUCT to the
graph with nominal values; namely θij = +1 on positive
edges and −1 on negative edges. Finally, in order to check
the convergence of ROBUST MAX-PRODUCT , we compute
p∗ by solving the minimax optimization problem in CVX[12].
Note that the latter is computationally much more expensive
than the ROBUST MAX-PRODUCT and MAX-PRODUCT .
Figures 1 summarizes the results for different values of ∆.
ROBUST MAX-PRODUCT was run for 100 iterations. For
∆ = 0, MAX-PRODUCT and ROBUST MAX-PRODUCT are
equivalent as Nature has no power. As ∆ increases, ROBUST
MAX-PRODUCT performs increasingly better compared to
MAX-PRODUCT .
Second Experiment: Let p∗ be the Engineer’s strategy given
by ROBUST MAX-PRODUCT algorithm, and let p˜∗ be the
one obtained by applying MAX-PRODUCT considering the
nominal values of the parameters. Finally, denote by q∗ and q˜∗,
Nature’s best responses against p∗ and p˜∗. In this experiment,
we compare the performance of strategies p∗ and p˜∗, when
Nature deviates from her optimal strategies q∗, q˜∗. More
specifically, Nature’s strategy is chosen to be a mixture of her
optimum strategy and the uniform distribution, i.e., q(θ) =
(1− α)q∗(θ) + α|Θ|−m and q˜(θ) = (1− α)q˜∗(θ) + α|Θ|−m.
Figure 2 illustrates the Engineer’s payoff for the pairs of
strategies (p∗, q(θ)) and (p˜∗, q˜(θ)), as α varies. Here, α = 0
corresponds to the case Nature chooses her optimum strat-
egy. ROBUST MAX-PRODUCT outperforms the simple MAX-
PRODUCT in this regime. As α increases, Nature changes
from being adversarial to completely random for α = 1. MAX-
PRODUCT outperforms ROBUST MAX-PRODUCT in the latter
case, since Nature is no-longer an adversary and one can
design for nominal values.
A. Main contributions
We consider a general bipartite graph (or factor graph) G =
(V, F,E), where nodes in V (variable nodes, to be denoted by
i, j, k, . . . ) are controlled by the Engineer, nodes in F (factor
nodes, denoted by a, b, c, . . . ) are controlled by Nature, and
E ⊆ V × F is a set of undirected edges. Given i ∈ V , the
set of its neighbors is denoted by ∂i = {a ∈ F : (i, a) ∈
E}. The neighborhood of a ∈ F , denoted by ∂a, is defined
analogously.
The objective function O : X V × ΘF → R factors on
graph G if1 there exists a set of functions ψ = {ψa : a ∈ F},
ψa : X ∂a ×Θ→ R such that
O(x, θ) =
∑
a∈F
ψa(x∂a; θa).
The functions ψa are called potentials. There is no loss of
generality in assuming G to be bipartite. If two nodes i,
j controlled by the same player were neighbors, we could
replace them by a single node with strategy space X ′ ≡ X×X .
As discussed above, our goal is to find a pair (p∗, q∗) where
p∗ is a probability distribution over X V , q∗ a distribution over
ΘF , and the pair satisfies the Nash equilibrium condition (1).
From the point of view of the Engineer, this amounts to solving
the problem
p∗ = arg max
p
min
q
E(p,q)O(x, θ) . (3)
The support supp(p) of a probability distribution p is the
smallest set S such that p(Sc) = 0.
1While slightly more general definitions (symmetric in x and θ) are
possible, we stick to the present one because it is already rich enough to
discuss all the key challenges.
Since E(p,q)O(x, θ) is linear both in p and q, which belong
to the simplex, (3) is equivalent to an LP problem. However,
the dimensionality of this problem is exponential in the graph
size: even writing down the strategy takes exponential time.
The following result plays a key role in our approach.
Theorem II.1. In problem (3), without loss of generality, we
can assume that the Engineer’s strategy is a Markov Random
Field (MRF) with factor graph G, and that Nature chooses
a product distribution. Explicitly, the Engineer’s strategy can
be assumed to take the form p∗(x) =
∏
a∈F fa(x∂a), while
Nature’s strategy takes the form q∗(θ) =
∏
a∈F ga(θa).
Proof: Note that the Engineer’s pay off is given by
E(p(x),q(θ))
∑
a∈F
ψa(x∂a; θa) =
∑
a∈F
Eqa(θa)Epa(x∂a)ψa(x∂a; θa).
Therefore, only the marginals qa(θa) of the Nature’s distri-
bution play role in the pay off. Hence, we can assume that
Nature has a product distribution q(θ) =
∏
a∈F qa(θa).
Similarly, only the marginals pa(x∂a) appears in the pay
off. Thereby, without loss of generality we can assume that
the Engineer’s distribution is an MRF with respect to G. This
follows from the fact that for all factor graphs G and for all
joint distributions p(x), there exists a distribution p˜(x) that is
representable as an MRF with graph G such that pa(x∂a) =
p˜a(x∂a) [17].
Notice that, for a graph G with bounded degree, a MRF can
be specified by O(|V |) parameters. In particular, the MRF
is completely specified by the marginals pa(x∂a). We then
reformulate the minimax problem as the one of computing
the minimax marginals {p∗a}a∈F . By definition, these belong
to the so-called marginal polytope [22]
MARG(G) ≡
{
{pa}a∈F
∣∣∣ pa(x∂a) = ∑
xV \∂a
p(x),
for some distribution p(x)
}
.
Problem 3 can therefore be restated as an LP over MARG(G):
maximize
pa(x∂a)
∑
a∈F
min
θa
[∑
x∂a
pa(x∂a)ψa(x∂a; θa)
]
,
s.t. {pa}a∈F ∈ MARG(G) .
(4)
Here we used the fact that the min over q in the simplex
is necessarily achieved at one extremal point, i.e. at a pure
strategy. In general, MARG(G) does not possess a polynomial
separation oracle and therefore this problem is not tractable.
Instead, we relax it to the set of locally consistent marginals
on G, denoted by LOC(G)
LOC(G) ={
{pa}a∈F
∃pi(xi) : pi(xi) ≥ 0,
∑
xi
pi(xi) = 1
pa(x∂a) ≥ 0,
∑
x∂a\i
pa(x∂a) = pi(xi)
}
.
(5)
We then have the following relaxation of problem (4) to the
local polytope.
(P0) : maximize
pa(x∂a)
∑
a∈F
min
θa
[∑
x∂a
pa(x∂a)ψa(x∂a; θa)
]
,
s.t. {pa}a∈F ∈ LOC(G) .
(6)
If G is a tree, then LOC(G) ≡ MARG(G) and therefore this
relaxation is exact.
III. ALGORITHM
Here, we first present the alternating direction method of
multipliers (ADMM) [10], [11] algorithm for solving convex
optimization problems and state a general result regarding
its convergence properties. Subsequently, we show how the
optimization problem (P0) can be transformed to conform with
the general form for the ADMM algorithm. We derive the RO-
BUST MAX-PRODUCT algorithm from the transformed variant
of the problem (P0) and obtain convergence guarantees using
the result stated for the general case of ADMM algorithms.
A. ADMM Algorithm
What follows is a short presentation of the ADMM al-
gorithm and its properties. The reader interested in a more
comprehensive treatment can refer to [4]. Consider the opti-
mization problem
minimize
x∈Rn,z∈Rm
f(x) + g(z),
s.t. Ax− z = 0.
(7)
where A ∈ Rp×n. The augmented Lagrangian for this problem
is defined as
Lρ(x, z, y) = f(x)+g(z)+y
T (Ax−z)+ 1
2
ρ‖Ax−z‖22. (8)
with ρ > 0 a parameter and ‖ · ‖2 indicating the `2 norm.
The ADMM algorithm tries to solve the above optimization
problem by starting from some initial estimates (z(0), y(0) =
0) and performing the following iteration
x(t+1) = argmin
x
Lρ(x, z
(t), y(t)) ,
z(t+1) = argmin
z
Lρ(x
(t+1), z, y(t)) ,
y(t+1) = y(t) + ρ(Ax(t+1) − z(t+1)).
(9)
The update rules in (9) closely resemble the dual gradient
descent method where the dual is obtained from the augmented
Lagrangian. This indeed is the gist of the method of multipli-
ers. Despite the fact that the primal optimization is done in two
steps and the augmented Lagrangian is used in place of the
Lagrangian, the iteration (9) provably converges to the solution
of 7. Formally, assume the optimization problem (7) has a
finite optimum value p∗. We say the Lagrangian L(x, z, y) has
a saddle point (x∗, z∗, y∗) if L(x∗, z∗, y) ≤ L(x∗, z∗, y∗) ≤
L(x, z, y∗) for all x, z, and y. Then the following theorem
holds.
Theorem III.1. ([10] Theorem 3.1, [8] Theorem 8, [4] Section
3.2) Assume that the extended real valued functions f(x) and
g(z) are closed, proper, and convex and the un-augmented
Lagrangian L0(x, z, y) has a saddle point. Then
lim
t→∞ f(x
(t)) + g(z(t))→ p∗
lim
t→∞Ax
(t) − z(t) → 0
lim
t→∞ y
(t) → y∗ (10)
B. ROBUST MAX-PRODUCT Algorithm
Note that the epigraph form of the optimization problem
(P0) is given by
minimize
∑
a∈F
λa
s.t. λa +
∑
x∂a
pa(x∂a)ψa(x∂a; θa) ≥ 0, ∀a, θa
pi(xi) =
∑
x∂a\i
pa(x∂a), ∀(i, a) ∈ E, xi∑
xi
pi(xi) = 1, ∀i ∈ V
pa(x∂a) ≥ 0, ∀(i, a) ∈ E, x∂a
pi(xi) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ V, xi
(11)
where the minimization is over {λa}a∈F , {pa}a∈F , {pi}i∈V
and LOC(G) is represented in terms of the set of marginals.
Define the indicator function I(·) as
I(x) =
{
0 if x = TRUE,
∞ if x = FALSE. (12)
Furthermore, let f({λa}a∈F , {pa}a∈F ) =
∑
a∈F f˜(λa, pa)
and g({pi}i∈V ) =
∑
i∈V g˜(pi) whereby f˜(λa, pa) and g˜(pi)
are defined as
f˜(λa, pa) = λa +
∑
θa∈Θ
I(λa +
∑
x∂a
pa(x∂a)ψa(x∂a; θa) ≥ 0)
+
∑
x∂a∈X |∂a|
I(pa(x∂a) ≥ 0), (13)
and
g˜ (pi) = I(pi ∈ S |X |−1). (14)
Here, S |X |−1 is the |X |−1 dimensional simplex and pa and pi
are the |X ||∂a| and |X | dimensional real vectors respectively.
It is easy to see that the extended real valued functions
f : R|F |+
∑
a∈F |X ||∂a| → (−∞,+∞]
g : R|V ||X | → (−∞,+∞]
are closed, convex, and proper.
Using the functions f and g, the optimization problem (11)
can be restated as
(P) :
minimize f({λa}a∈F , {pa}a∈F ) + g({pi}i∈V )
s.t. pi(xi) =
∑
x∂a\i
pa(x∂a\i;xi), ∀(a, i) ∈ E,
∀xi ∈ X ,
TABLE I
ROBUST MAX-PRODUCT ALGORITHM
Robust Max-Product:
Input: Factor graph G(V, F,E), potential functions {ψa(x∂a, θa}a∈F
Output: Local marginals {pa(x∂a)}a∈F
1. Initialize:
u
(0)
ai (x) = 0, ∀ (a, i) ∈ E, x ∈ X
p
(0)
i (x) =
1
|X | , ∀ i ∈ V, x ∈ X
2. Update until convergence:
At the factor nodes:{
p
(t+1)
a , λ
(t+1)
a
}
= argmin
pa,λa
λa +
ρ
2
∑
i∈∂a
xi∈X
( ∑
x∂a\i
pa(x∂a\i;xi)− p(t)i (xi)− u(t)ai (xi)
)2
s.t. λa +
∑
x∂a
pa(x∂a)ψa(x∂a; θa) ≥ 0, ∀a, θa
pa(x∂a) ≥ 0, ∀x∂a ∈ X |∂a|
At the variable nodes:
p
(t+1)
i = ΠS|X|−1
 1
|∂i|
∑
a∈∂i
∑
x∂a\i
p(t)a (x∂a\i; ·)− u(t)ai (·)

 ,
u
(t+1)
ai (xi) = u
(t)
ai (xi) +
∑
x∂a\i
p(t+1)a (x∂a\i;xi)− p(t+1)i (xi) ∀ i, a ∈ ∂i, xi ∈ X .
3. Return: {pa}a∈F .
where the minimization is over {λa}a∈F , {pa}a∈F , and
{pi}i∈V . Optimization problem (P) follows the form of the
general problem in Eq. (7) and can be solved using the ADMM
algorithm. The augmented Lagrangian for problem (P) can be
written as
Lρ
({λa}a∈F , {pa}a∈F , {pi}i∈V , {uai}(a,i)∈E) =∑
a∈F
f˜(λa, pa) +
∑
i∈V
g˜ (pi)
+
∑
(a,i)∈E,xi∈X
uai(xi)
(
pi(xi)−
∑
x∂a\i
pa(x∂a\i;xi)
)
+
∑
(a,i)∈E,xi∈X
ρ
(
pi(xi)−
∑
x∂a\i
pa(x∂a\i;xi)
)2
,
(15)
where ρ is a parameter and ua,i(xi) are the dual variables.
Notice that the special form of the constraint results in the
quadratic penalty being block separable in {pa}a∈F . Further-
more, the function f is also block separable in {pa}a∈F ,
as well. Similarly, the quadratic penalty and the function g
are separable in {pi}i∈V . These facts enable us to further
decompose the first two steps of the ADMM iteration (Eq.
(9)) and perform the optimization at the corresponding check
and variable node locally. The resulting algorithm is presented
in Table III-B.
C. Convergence of the ROBUST MAX-PRODUCT Algorithm
For (a, i) ∈ E, xi ∈ X and local marginals {pa}a∈F ,
{pi}i∈V , define the marginal inconsistency residual rai(xi)
as
rai(xi) = pi(xi)−
∑
x∂a\i
pa(x∂a\i;xi). (16)
Let r ∈ R|E|×|X| be the vector of residuals defined as
r = ({rai(xi)}(a,i)∈E,xi∈X ). In particular, let r(t) be the
marginal inconsistency residual at iteration t of the ROBUST
MAX-PRODUCT algorithm.
Define C(t) = ∑a∈F λ(t)a , the cost function at iteration t
of the ROBUST MAX-PRODUCT algorithm and let C∗ be the
optimum value of the optimization problem (6). Figures 3 and
4 show C(t) and 1|E||X |‖r(t)‖1 as a function of t (iteration) for
the Ising model described in Section II with ∆ = 1. Figure 4
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shows that the marginals quickly become nearly consistent
while Fig 3 demonstrates that the objective value converges
to the optimum value as number of iteration increases to a
modest number.
The following theorem provides theoretical guarantees for
the behavior observed in Figures 3 and 4. In particular, it states
that the sequence of local marginals in the ROBUST MAX-
PRODUCT algorithm converges to a set of locally consistent
marginals that achieves the optimum payoff for the Engineer.
Theorem III.2. For any graph G(F, V,E) and set of potential
functions {ψa(x∂a)}a∈F the followings hold.
(i) lim
t→∞ r
(t) = 0.
(ii) lim
t→∞ C
(t) = C∗.
The proof of this theorem can be obtained by applying the
result of the following lemma to Theorem III.1.
Lemma III.1. . For any graph G(F, V,E) and potential
functions {ψa(x∂a)}a∈F , the optimization problem (6) is fea-
sible. Furthermore, there exist {λ∗a}a∈F , {p∗a}a∈F , {p∗i }i∈V ,
and {uai}∗(a,i)∈E such that ({λ∗a}a∈F , {p∗a}a∈F , {p∗i }i∈V ,
{uai}∗(a,i)∈E) is a saddle point of the augmented Lagrangian
(15) with ρ = 0 and
∑
a∈F λ
∗
a = C∗.
Proof: Consider the optimization problem in Eq. (11).
First note that given the potential functions {ψa(x∂a)}a∈F
are bounded, this problem has a strictly feasible point. Also
it is a linear program. Hence the strong duality holds by
Slater’s theorem [5] and the Lagrangian has a saddle point.
Let {λ∗a}a∈F , {p∗a}a∈F , {p∗i }i∈V be the values of the primal
variables at this saddle point. Similarly, let {u∗ai}(a,i)∈E be
the values of the dual variables corresponding to the con-
straints pi(xi) =
∑
x∂a\i
pa(x∂a) at this saddle point. Then
{λ∗a}a∈F , {p∗a}a∈F , {p∗i }i∈V are primal optimal for (11). In
particular,
∑
a∈F λ
∗
a = C∗. Furthermore, it is easy to see
that({λ∗a}a∈F , {p∗a}a∈F , {p∗i }i∈V , {u∗ai}(a,i)∈E) is a saddle
point of the Lagrangian in Eq. (15) with ρ = 0.
IV. RELATED WORK
Several groups investigated the impact of graphical model
structure on the computational properties of Nash equilibria
[14], [18], [7], [9]. In particular, Ortiz and Kearns [18]
proposed a message passing algorithm (called NASHPROP) to
find Nash equilibria. However, as shown in [9], the problem of
computing Nash equilibria is PPAD-complete even on trees.
Within graphical games studied in this literature, a different
player controls each vertex of a graph, and a game is played
along each edge. A single player has at her disposal only
a small number of pure strategies (typically two), and the
problem complexity arises because of the large number of
players.
Let us emphasize that the present paper studies a very
different class of models. We consider a small fixed number
of players (indeed in this paper only two players), but each
of them has at her disposal a large number of pure strategies.
The problem complexity is due to the strategies proliferation.
The motivation for focusing on two-players zero-sum games
came from their relevance to optimization and inference under
model uncertainty. A few authors [13], [20] have already an-
alyzed the sensitivity of message passing algorithms to model
uncertainty. However these studies assumed a probability
distribution over model parameters, which is very restrictive
in a high-dimensional setting, or carried out a perturbation
analysis, without constructing more robust algorithms.
ADMM and many related algorithms (Uzawa’s algorithm,
Douglas-Rachford splitting, proximal method, Bregman iter-
ative methods, etc.) have been around for a few decades.
However, recent years have seen a surge of interest in these
algorithms in many fields. The reader can refer to [4] for many
examples in the field of statistical learning. Closer to the spirit
of this paper, [19] uses the technique of Bregman projection
to obtain fractional solution for the maximum a posteriori
probability (MAP) problem in graphical models. The problem
addressed in this paper is fundamentally different from this
work in that we consider the case of adversarial uncertainty
in the model.
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